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Originally Posted by buckeyegrad
I disagree that what happened to Adams was a demonstration that the VP was not seen as a legislative role by the Founders. I would argue that Adams misinterpreted the legislative role of the position (as would Palin's description). That is why I focused more on Jefferon's rather than Adams' approach as Jefferson seems to have defined the legislative role (which he stated in his VP inagural address that it was the position most important role according to the Constitution--see link I provided earlier) in a much more agreeable fashion to the Founders.
Out of curiosity as merely an intellectual exercise, what do you think would have happened if Adams had not backed down? With no Marbury v. Madison to justy the Court's involvement yet, how would the matter have been decided? Would the Court's have asserted its judicial review power earlier in this matter or would have someone else had to settle the disagreement?
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Hell of a question Grad.

With no Marbury v Madison and no Supreme Court precedent that allowed them to even decide the issue, the role could have been defined by resolution or legislation each term, or more likely they might have tried to Amend the role by defining it.
One thing that is fascinating is the difficult task of devining the intest of the Framers. One big reason is they did not agree what it meant when they approved it. Deals were brokered and sides were told that language meant one thing and the other side told it meant something else.
Certainly Jeff knew what HE thought it meant, or even intended it to mean. Some of the members of the Constitutional Convention refused to sign it as they disagreed with parts of it. Others signed it but had different views about what the language meant.
Here are Madison's notes about the debate on the language that made the Veep the President of the Senate.
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Section 3. (see Sepr. 4). "The vice President shall be ex-officio President of the Senate"
Mr. GERRY opposed this regulation. We might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely improper. He was agst. having any vice President.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS. The vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice president, the President of the Senate would be temporary successor, which would amount to the same thing.
Mr. SHERMAN saw no danger in the case. If the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment, and some member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be but seldom.
Mr. RANDOLPH concurred in the opposition to the clause.
Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed that such an officer as vice-President was
not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time.
Col: MASON, thought the office of vice-President an encroachment on the rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative & Executive, which as well as the Judiciarydepartments, [FN7] ought to be kept as separate as possible. He took occasion to express his dislike of any reference whatever of the power to make appointments to either branch of the Legislature. On the other hand he was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the President alone. As a method for avoiding both, he suggested that a privy Council of six members to the president should be established; to be chosen for six years by the Senate, two out of the Eastern two out of the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of the Union, & to go out in rotation two every second year; the concurrence of the Senate to be required only in the appointment of Ambassadors, and in making treaties, which are more of a legislative nature. This would prevent the constant sitting of the Senate which he thought dangerous, as well as keep the departments separate & distinct. It would also save the expence of constant sessions of the Senate. He had he said always considered the Senate as too unwieldy & expensive for appointing officers, especially the smallest, such as tide waiters &c. He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it could be easily done if it should be found acceptable.
On the question shall the vice President be ex officio President of the Senate?
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del ay. Mas no. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
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